WHEN SYMBOLS CLASH: REFLECTIONS ON
THE FUTURE OF THE COMPARATIVE
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OF
DEATH SENTENCESt
David Baldus*

A.

Two SYMBoLs: IN CONFLICT

This Article addresses the interaction between two important
symbols in American life today: the death penalty and equal justice
under the law. First, the death penalty reflects society's commitment to the protection of innocent human life and its condemnation of our most culpable criminals.' It also is said to reflect
society's desire for retribution, revenge, and deterrence. Like
many other important symbols, the death penalty simplifies a complex issue, unites much of the public in the belief that something
is being done about an important problem, and by reassuring the
public, may bring a level of quiescence and satisfaction to the community. For example, Philadelphia's District Attorney, Lynn Abraham, believes in and regularly seeks the death penalty, not because
she believes it has a deterrent effect, but rather because she believes it gives the community a sense of control and satisfaction.'
In my continuing research on the death penalty, I have found the
literature on symbols in political life helpful in understanding our
death penalty politics and practices.3
One important feature of the death penalty in America today
t This article was delivered by the author as the luncheon address at the Seton Hall
Law Review's Symposium on Capital Punishment, on November 2, 1995. I
acknowledge with gratitude comments on an earlier version of this article by: James
Acker, Dale Jones, Michael Radelet, Ronald Tabak, Neil Weiner, and David
Zuckerman.

* David C. Baldus received his A.B. from Dartmouth College, his MA. from the
University of Pittsburgh, and his J.D. from Yale Law School. He is presently the Joseph B. Tye Professor of Law at the University of Iowa College of Law where he
teaches Criminal Law, Anti-discrimination Law, Capital Punishment Law, Federal
Criminal Law, and Admiralty.
I See generally FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND

(1987).
The DeadliestD.A., N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 16, 1995, at 23 ("To
[Abraham, the death penalty] doesn't offer society control over crime-she doesn't
believe it's a deterrent-but instead gives the feeling of control demanded by a city in
decay.").
3 See generally DAVID KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS AND POWER (1988); MURRAY
EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF PoLTIcs (1967).
THE AMERICAN AGENDA
2 Tina Rosenberg,
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is that the amount of symbolic ritual required to produce quiescence in a particular community varies significantly from place to
place. At one extreme is New Hampshire, which has a statute on
the books but no capital prosecutions of which I am aware and no
prisoners on death row. At the other extreme is Texas, which averages about one execution every three weeks. Between these extremes is a substantial range of death penalty activity in terms of
the numbers of sentences imposed, the size of death row, and the
number and timing of actual executions. 4
Another important feature of American death penalty politics
is the significant variation from place to place in the community's
tolerance for resistance to the death penalty by public officials. By
tolerance I refer to the level of resistance, opposition, or inaction
the community will allow before it is aroused and retaliates politically. There are different tolerance levels both among and within
individual states. Of particular note is that tolerance for resistance
to the death penalty has little correlation with the levels of public
support for the death penalty expressed in public opinion polls.
That support is the same, from 70% to 80%, in every part of the
country-from abolitionist states like Iowa and Wisconsin to the
states in the deep South.'
4 Death Row, U.S.A., Execution Update (NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Fall 1995, at 1. In my opinion, variations in the level of
death penalty activity required for community quiescence are quite like the variations
in dosage required to bring quiescence to people who are dependent on chemicals
such as drugs, alcohol, and tobacco. For some people, a lot of the chemical is required each day, while for others a small dose is sufficient. In drug dependence theory, psychological dependence is generally defined as "a condition in which a drug
produces a feeling of satisfaction and the psychic drive that requires periodic or continuous administration of the drug to produce pleasure or to avoid discomfort."
WORLD HE.mTH ORGANIZATION EXPERT COMMrrEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE, TWENTIETH

(1974), quoted in HANNES PETURSSON & MALCOLM LADER, DEPENDENCE ON
TRANQUILUZERS 6 (1984). When a dependent drug user does not take the amount of
the drug to which he or she is accustomed, withdrawal and agitation occur. Id. at 3.
Additionally, with continued use, an addict may develop tolerance where "a given
dose of a drug produces a decreased effect or, conversely, increasingly larger doses
must be administered to obtain the effects observed with the original dose." J.H.
Jaffe, DrugAddiction and Drug Abuse, in THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS
7 (A. Goodman Gilman et al. eds., 1980).
5 James A. Fox et al., Death Penalty Opinion in the Post-FurmanYears, 18 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 499, 520 (1991) (attitudes toward capital punishment are fairly
stable throughout the various regions of the United States). See, e.g., Neil Vidmar &
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Research on Attitudes Toward CapitalPunishment, in THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMEwCA 68, 86 (Hugo A. Bedau ed. 1982) (tracking death penalty support
in the four major regions of the country between the years 1972-77 and illustrating
generally stable support throughout the country). For an excellent critique of the
interaction between politics and the death penalty, see generally Stephen B. Bright &
REPORT
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In most death penalty states, North and South, candidates for
highly visible statewide and national office who oppose the death
penalty generally do not succeed politically. This is also the case in
many abolitionist states like Iowa and Massachusetts. However, at
lower, less visible levels, especially in the North, legislators can resist and still prosper. Additionally, prosecutors everywhere routinely can waive the death penalty, especially in low visibility cases,
without political risk. Indeed, in NewYork, despite very strong support for capital punishment in the polls, four of New York City's
five prosecutors apparently perceive no significant risk in announcing that they would use it only in very special circumstances.6 Similarly, in Pennsylvania, the district attorney in Pittsburgh has for
years shown little enthusiasm for the death penalty at no political
risk.7
State court judges, of course, run similar political risks. For
example, in a recent Georgia case involving a "two-strikes-andyou're-out" statute, a four-to-three decision of the state supreme
court was withdrawn and reversed by a new four-to-three opinion,
thirteen days later. The court's reversal occurred after the attorney
general expressed great concern that the theory of the case, which
had recognized a prima facie claim of racial discrimination, might
be extended to permit death sentenced offenders to successfully
challenge their sentences.' In contrast, in California, it took sixtyone consecutive votes to vacate death sentences by Chief Justice
Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court to arouse the voters to

PatrickJ. Keenan, Judges and the Politicsof Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and
the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759 (1995).
6 Robert T. Johnson, the Bronx District Attorney, initially said he would refuse to
seek the death penalty in any case. Adam Nossiter, Balking Prosecutors: A Door Opens to
Death Row Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 1995, at A27. Yet, Johnson was re-elected
in a 1995 election. Ian Fisher, Election 1995: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1995, at
BI. However, after withstanding pressure to seek a death sentence in a widely publicized police victim case, Johnson said that he had not ruled out entirely the possibility
of seeking the death penalty in the case. Rachel Swarns, A Killing in the Bronx: The
Overview: The Governor Removes Bronx ProsecutorFrom Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1996, at Al. Apparently, one reason the governor acted as he did was to reduce the
risk that the decisions of prosecutors who consistently waive the death penalty in
death-eligible cases might threaten, on a theory of comparative excessiveness in the
New York Court of Appeals, the death sentences that are imposed in the state. Additionally, the District Attorneys of Manhattan, Queens, and Brooklyn have all criticized
the New York death penalty statute, but pledge to use it in the appropriate highly
aggravated case. Nossiter, supra, at A27.
7 See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 23.
8 See Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560 (1995) (substituting judgment for previous
order entered 13 days earlier).
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remove her from office in 1986. 9
The second symbol referred to in the title of this paper is the
concept of equal justice under the law. In the context of the criminal justice system, the idea of equal justice manifests itself first in a
commitment to comparable treatment of similarly situated defendants, without regard to their race or socioeconomic status. Under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court has defined this commitment as a prohibition
against purposeful racial discrimination."0 This prohibition clearly
applies in the death sentencing context,1 but the burden of proof
established in McClesky v. Kemp' 2 is nearly impossible to satisfy. As a
consequence, to date, no claim of racial discrimination in the ad13
ministration of the death penalty has been successfully advanced.
The commitment to equal justice also contemplates substantially comparable treatment of similarly situated defendants without regard to race. In the death penalty context, this commitment
was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia,4
which purported to invalidate death sentences in cases that cannot
be meaningfully distinguished, in terms of defendants' criminal
culpability, from many other cases where lesser sentences are typically imposed. The Furman ideal of equal justice embodies, therefore, a commitment to comparative proportionality.
The commitment to equal justice is also reflected in the requirement in more than twenty death sentencing states that no
death sentence may be executed until the state supreme court determines that the sentence is not excessive when compared with
"similar cases considering both the circumstances of the crime and
5
the character and record of the defendant."'
9 Douglas P. Shuit, Death Penalty Draws Little DebateDuring This PoliticalSeason Campaigns: Legal and Political Climate is So Heavily Weighted in Favor of Carrying Out Execu-

tion, LA. TIMs, Apr. 15, 1992, at B2.
10 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
11 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986); Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982).
12 481 U.S. 279 (1987).

13 Under the Eighth Amendment, an accused may successfully challenge a death
sentence where the circumstances of the case suggest a substantial risk that race was a
factor in the sentencing. Under McClesky, however, proving such a claim is particularly burdensome.
14 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
15 The principal policy reasons animating concern about comparatively excessive
death sentences are described infra. The states which currently or formerly required
proportionality reviews include: Alabama, ALA. CODE 13A-5-53(b) (3); Connecticut,
CONN.GEN. STAT. 53a-46b(3); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. Trr. II, 4209(g); Georgia, GA
CODE ANN. 17-10-35(c) (3) Idaho, IDAHO CODE 19-2827(c); Kentucky, Ky. RFv. STAT.
ANN. 532.075(3); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN.[(CRuM. LAw] 414(e); Mississippi, Miss. Co-
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Comparative proportionality review is the process in which a
state court compares the facts and circumstances of a death sentence case with other death eligible-cases that result in either death
or lesser sentences. Under one method of review, known as the
frequency approach, the court first evaluates the frequency with
which death sentences are imposed among cases in the jurisdiction
that are comparable to the review case. The court then determines
whether the death sentencing frequency among the similar cases is
16
sufficiently high to justify the death sentence before the court.
The "precedent seeking" or "comparative culpability" approach is
the more commonly used method of review. 7 Under this method,
the court, on the basis of the facts and criminal culpability of the
death cases before it, determines whether the review case is more
comparable to past cases where life sentences were imposed or to
those where death was imposed. When the review case appears
more comparable to life sentence cases, it is found to be comparatively excessive and the sentence is reduced to life imprisonment.
When, however, the review case appears more comparable to prior
death sentence cases, the death sentence is affirmed as not
excessive.
A principal theme of many pro-death penalty advocates over
DEx ANN. 99-19-105(3); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. 565.035(3); Montana, MONT. CODE
ANN. 46-18-310(3); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. 29-2521.01 et seq.; Nevada, NEv. REV.
STAT. 177.055(2)(d); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 630.5(XI); New Jersey,
N.J. REv. STAT. 2C:11-3(e); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. 31-20A-4(c); NewYork, N.Y.
CRiM. PROC. 470.30(3); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. 15A-2000(d); Ohio, OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. 2929.05(A); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 9711(H); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. 16-3-25(c); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. 23A-27A-12;
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. 39-13-206; Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. 17-110.1; Washington, WASH. REv. CODE 10-95-130(2); Wyoming, Wvo. STAT. 6-4-103(d).

In a few other states, the courts conduct proportionality review, even though they
are not required to do so by statute. These states include: Arkansas, see Sheridan v.
State, 855 S.W.2d 772, 780 (Ark. 1993) (making proportionality review for death
sentences mandatory); Florida, see Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991)
(stating that the Florida Supreme Court has made proportionality review mandatory
for death sentences); Louisiana, see State v. Davis, 637 So. 2d 1012, 1031 (La. 1994)
(" [C] omparative proportionality review remains a relevant consideration in determining the issue of excessiveness in Louisiana"); and Illinois, see People v. Tye, 565
N.E.2d 931, 945 (Ill.
1991).
16 See State v. Stokes, 352 S.E.2d 653, 666 (N.C. 1987) ("[I]n robbery murder cases
where conviciton rests solely on a felony murder theory, juries in this state almost
invariably have recommended life imprisonment rather than death.").
17 See State v. Williams, 452 S.E.2d 245, 278 (N.C. 1994) (affirming a death sentence reasoning that "the present case is most analogous to cases in which this Court
has held the death penalty to be proportionate"). The distinction between the different approaches to proportionality review is addressed in State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d
1059 (N.J. 1992) and discussed in DAVID C. BALDus ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY 281-82 (1990).
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the last decade has been that these two symbols - the death penalty and equal justice under the law - cannot co-exist. The argument is that close scrutiny of the way in which death sentencing
systems actually function and meaningful consideration of claims
of arbitrariness and discrimination will result in the de facto abolition of the death penalty.' 8 I think this claim is false. Nevertheless,
it was a significant argument advanced in the United States Congress in 1994 to defeat the Racial Justice Act, a measure which
would have allowed death-sentenced offenders to raise claims of
racial discrimination in federal courts.' 9 The argument may also
have been a consideration in the legislatures of a handful of states
that have repealed altogether or narrowed the scope of their proportionality review statutes. °
In my opinion, this same tension between the two symbols has
also substantially limited the utility of proportionality review in the
state courts that have attempted to apply the requirement over the
last 20 years. Indeed, during this time, I estimate that fewer than
75 of the 5000 plus death sentences imposed have been vacated on
grounds of excessiveness. 2 '
18 David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability"of Racial Discrimination in
Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51
WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 359, 418 (1994).
19 Id. at 380.
20 States that have abandoned proportionality review include: Arizona, see State v.
Salazar, 844 P.2d 566, 583-84 (Az. 1992) (stating that the Arizona Supreme Court will
discontinue proportionality reviews); Maryland, 1992 MD. LAws 331 (H.B. 590);
Idaho, 1994 IDAHO SESS. LAws 127 (S.B. 1302); Connecticut, 1995 Conn. Acts 16 (Reg.
Sess.) and Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-103(d). Several other state legislatures have
significantly restricted the scope of proportionality review, including: New Jersey, NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3 (limiting proportionality review to a comparison only of cases in
which the death sentence has been imposed); Utah, see State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629,
656-57 (Utah 1995) (refusing to engage in comparative proportionality review, but
applying a "crime-to-sentence" review); Idaho, 1994 IDAHO SESS. LAws 127 (S.B. 1302)
(deleting comparative nature of review); Nevada, 1985 Nev. Stat. 527 (deleting comparative nature of review requirement).
Some states have never engaged in proportionality review. These states include:
California, see People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 663 (Cal. 1989) (stating that proportionality review is not required in California); Colorado, see People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159,
173-74 (Colo. 1990) (stating that proportionality review is not required in Colorado);
Indiana, see Brewer v. State, 417 N.E.2d 889, 900-01 (Ind. 1981) (stating that proportionality review is not required in Indiana); Oregon, see Satte v. Cunningham, 880
P.2d 431, 443 (Or. 1994) (stating that proportionality review is not required in Oregon); Kansas; Texas, Oklahoma; and Virginia. Nor do the federal death penalty statutes require proportionality review.
21 BALDuS ET AL., supra note 17, at 294 (1990) (listing cases vacated on grounds of
excessiveness as of 1987). More recently, only the Florida and Illinois courts use their
proportionality review powers with any regularity. See Sinclair v. State, 657 So. 2d 1138
(Fla. 1995) (robbery aggravator with substantial non-statutory mitigation); Thompson
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Should, therefore, the entire enterprise of proportionality review be scrapped? Most states that required comparative proportionality review from the outset still maintain the requirement on
the books, despite the legislative trend against it and the fact that
the review conducted by most courts has little or no substance and
serves only a symbolic function. Nevertheless, the retention of
these laws on the books provides some measure of the power, albeit weak, of the equal justice symbol. 2
B.

WHAT ROLE FOR PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

In spite of this history, I continue to believe that proportional-

ity review has a role, particularly in the North, where the commitment to equal justice has more force than it does elsewhere. As I
see it, the appropriate goal of proportionality review is the same
today as it was in 1973 - to limit death sentences to the worst
offenders whose cases can be meaningfully distinguished from the
v. State, 647 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1994); Clark v. State, 609 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1992) (robber
aggravator with substantial mitigation); Clark v. State, 609 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1992) (pecuniary gain aggravator and several non-statutory mitigators); McKinney v. State, 579
So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1991) (violent prior felony aggravator and several non-statutory mitigators); Penn v. State, 574 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1991); Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla.
1991) (heinous and atrocious aggravator with several mitigators); Blakely v. State, 561
So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1990) (two aggravators but murder is a result of heated domestic
confrontation); Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1990) (heinous and atrocious
aggravators with substantial mitigation); Fitzpatrick v. State, 527 So. 2d 809 (Fla.
1988) (multiple aggravators but a low intelligence, childlike defendant under extreme emotional disturbance); Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d (Fla. 1988) (murder a result of heated domestic confrontation); Lloyd v. State, 524 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1988);
Fead v. State, 512 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1987); Proffitt v. State, 510 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1987)
(residential burglary, without more, and substantial mitigation); People v. Leger, 597
N.E.2d 586 (111. 1992) (no significant history of prior criminal conduct and murder
precipitated by stressful circumstance or emotional disturbance).
The Florida cases cited above all involve a jury death sentence recommendation
that was followed by a judge who sentenced the defendant to death. These cases are
to be distinguished from another line of Florida cases in which a trial judge's decision
to impose a death sentence overrides an earlier jury life sentence recommendation.
In these cases, the Florida Supreme Court routinely vacates the judicially imposed
death sentence on the authority of Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (1975), which
requires reinstitution of the jury's life sentence recommendation unless it concludes
that no reasonable person could have voted for a sentence other than death. The
language of the Florida Supreme Court's opinion reinstating life sentences under
Tedder often turns both on implicit judgments of comparative culpability among the
cases the court has reviewed, as well as on explicit comparisons of the review cases
with other cases in which the court has applied Tedder to vacate judicially imposed
death sentences.
22 For example, the New Jersey Legislature, which could have completely eliminated the proportionality review requirement, chose instead to retain it in form only
by limiting the comparative reviews solely to "similar" cases in which a death sentence
was imposed.
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great bulk of homicide cases that result in lesser punishments. 23
The salience of that objective was highlighted recently in a critique
of the current status of the death penalty in America by Judge Alex
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.24 Judge Kozinski
noted that despite very broad death sentencing statutes and widespread public support for the death penalty, few people are actually executed. 25 To put his remarks in fuller context, I estimate
that the American death penalty system annually processes from
2,000 to 4,000 death eligible cases and imposes 250 to 300 death
sentences. Moreover, until 1995, fewer than forty executions per
year were actually carried out. Since 1973, over 5,000 death
sentences have been imposed, 2,000 of which were vacated, and
just over 300 have resulted in executions, leaving approximately
3,000 on death row today.26
Judge Kozinski argues, and I agree, that this situation of legal
stalemate is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. I also
share his belief that it is improbable that the United States
Supreme Court will dismantle the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence which enables death sentenced offenders to resist execution
in the courts.28 I further share his belief that it is unlikely that
American society would tolerate the level of violence that would be
required to make a substantial dent in our current nationwide
death row population of 3,000 people.'
23 SeeFurman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White,J., concurring) ("[T]he
death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes
and there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not").
24 See generally Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run on Sentence,
46 CASE WEST. RES. L. REv. 1 (1995).
25 As of April 30, 1996, there were 3,122 death row inmates. Death Row, U.S.A.,
(NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Spring 1996, at
1.
26 Id.
27 See Kozinski and Gallagher, supra note 24, at 19-20.
28 See id. at 2.
29 This is not China, where more than 2,000 people have been executed in a single
year, or Africa or the Middle East, where large numbers are dispatched on a single
day. In China, levels of crime lag far behind those in Western cities. However, about
65 crimes (one-third of all serious criminal offenses in China) are now punishable by
death including such crimes as serious prostitution, trade in cultural relics, sabotage
of dikes, and organized secret religious societies. Lena H. Sun, Turmoil in China
Brings an Increase in Executions,AUSTIN AmERiCAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 10, 1994, at 2. This
system results in large numbers of death sentences and executions. In 1992, China
executed at least 1,079 prisoners. Lucy Johnson, China Human Rights: More Than
1,400 Executed in 1993, INTER PRESS SERV., May 5, 1994, at 1. In 1993, at least 2,564
people were sentenced to death and more than 1,419 were executed. Id. In 1994,
Amnesty International counted 1,791 executions, but believes the actual figure to be
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The current system has several practical consequences. First,
it delivers little in the way of deterrence or retribution. Second, it
delivers much more death penalty ritual than is required to fulfill
the symbolic functions of the death penalty."0 Third, the relatively
few defendants who are actually executed are often not the most
heinous and aggravated killers, and the defendants whose death
sentences are reduced to life on appeal, or in retrials, are often
among the most aggravated killers, thereby giving the process of
ultimate selection for death a random quality."1 Fourth, the risk of
racial bias is heightened in case categories that are not highly aggravated. 2 Fifth, the system involves substantial public investment,
and the opportunity costs on the business of state and federal
courts are very high.3 Sixth, the large number of death sentence
cases in the legal system slows down the pace of actual executions
by creating, in many states, long queues of cases awaiting decision
much higher. China's LegislatureExtends Death Penalty to Economic Crimes, ASSOCIATED
PREss, June 30, 1995, available in 1995 WL 4395422, at 1. China has been reported to
execute large numbers of people in a given day; on one day in 1993, it was reported
that 62 prisoners were put to death. David Mazie, Death Penalty Remains Alive Around
the World, LA. TnmAs, Jan. 16, 1994, at A2.
In August 1983, Chinese authorities launched a nationwide campaign against
crime during which extremely high numbers of executions were carried out. Amnesty International recorded 600 in only a few places in China during the first three
months of the campaign. Foreign press reports estimated the total number of executions during these three months to be over 5,000. One Hong Kong publication reported that over 10,000 people were executed in China between August of 1983 and
January of 1984. SeeAmnesty International, China: Violations of Human Rights 54-55
(1984).
Additionally, other countries are known to be frequent users of the death penalty. Iran, for example, executed at least 1,791 people between 1983-1987, with as
many as 661 in one year. ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTv 49 (1989). Nigeria is
reported to have executed at least 773 people during the same time period, with as
many as 355 in one year. Id. These figures are certainly underestimates and are
based on official announcements of executions. Id.
30 Also, by keeping death cases active for so many years before the death sentence
is vacated or the defendant is resentenced to life in a retrial, the pain and suffering of
the victims' families is prolonged, and emotional closure is significantly delayed.
31 Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 24, at 31.
32 This is documented by my own research in both Georgia and New Jersey, see
BALDus ET AL., supranote 17, at 321-22, and is recognized by experienced participants
in the system. See Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 24, at 32. A considerable portion
of the American public perceives racial and socioeconomic discrimination in the administration of the death penalty. A 1991 Gallup Poll reported that 41% of whites
and 73% of blacks believe that "[a] black person is more likely than a white person to
receive the death penalty for the same crime." The same poll indicated that 59% of
whites and 72% of blacks believe that poor people are more likely to receive the death
penalty for the same crime committed by "a person of average or above average income." The Death Penalty, Gallup Poll, vol. 1991 (June 26, 1991).
33 Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 24, at 11-16.
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at each stage in the process of post-conviction review.3 4
The list of adverse consequences of the current broadly focused system suggests the advantages that could flow from a more
narrowly focused death penalty that limits death sentencing to the
worst cases and "sentence[s] to death about the number we truly
have the means and will to execute."35
In the view of some people, including Judge Kozinski, such a
system would enhance deterrence and retribution. The output of
the system would also appear less random and capricious, and
would reduce the risk of racial discrimination. Finally, it would reduce public expenditures and opportunity costs in the courts,
while fully serving the symbolic functions of the death penalty in
the community at large.
How might the goal of limiting the death penalty to the worst
cases be achieved or even attempted? On this issue, I consider it
helpful to view the output of the American death penalty system as
subject to regulation by an invisible hand. It clearly is controlled
by no single entity, nor is its output prescribed by explicit agreement among the principal actors in the system.3 6 Rather, the system reflects an initial legislative judgment about the appropriate
breadth of each state's statute. Additionally, in the prosecution of
individual death eligible cases, it reflects thousands of decisions
made annually by prosecutors, jurors, judges, and governors.
These decisions reflect legal, economic, political and moral considerations; but they also appear to reflect judgments about the level
of death penalty activity that the community expects. I believe this
hypothesis draws support from the significantly different levels of
death penalty activity we see in different states. The hypothesis further is supported by the apparent stability from year to year of the
sentences imposed and executions conducted. The data in Table 1
(death sentences) and Table 2 (executions) reflect both the variability among states and the stability within them. Of particular
note is the experience in Louisiana in 1987 when eight people
were executed in the span of eleven weeks. Over the following year
34

See Michael L. Radelet & Michael Mellow, Death to Life Overrides: Saving the Re-

sources of the lorida Supreme Court,20 FLA. STATE U.L. REv. 195, 213-14 (1992). Radelet
and Mellow develop the theory of the long queue in an assessment of the Florida
court's practice of generally sustaining trial court decisions to override jury recommended death sentences. See id.; see also Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 26, at 2-3
(describing the backlog of cases in specific courts).
35 Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 24, at 31.
36

See generally Franklin Zimring, Ambivalence in State CapitalPunishment Policy: An

Experimental Sounding, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.

CHANGE

729 (1991).
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not a single death sentence was returned at a penalty trial in the
entire state." Thereafter, the numbers of executions in Louisiana
have been much lower and more stable.
The geographic variability of death penalty activity also supports the observation of Hugo Bedau that the public's support for
the death penalty expressed in opinion polls very likely means different things in different communities."8 In some places it means
support for actual executions, while in other communities the symbolic function of the death penalty is satisfied with ritual that falls
considerably short of actual executions.
C. TowARD A NARROWER DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM
What institutions, therefore, are in the best position to limit
our current system to a worst case scenario focus? Given our current political climate, state legislatures seem unlikely candidates.
The current trend in most state legislatures is in the direction of
expanding rather than contracting the current system.
Gubernatorial commutation is another unlikely alternative. In
the pre-Furman period, about a quarter of death sentences were
commuted by gubernatorial decisions.3 9 However, today that tradition has withered to virtually zero in most states.'
37 Jason DePaule, Abstract Death Penalty Meets Real Executions: Did State of Louisiana
Electrocution Affect Juries?, N.Y. Tzias, June 30, 1991, at E2.
38 See HuGo A. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMEIucA 68 (1982) (addressing the

ambiguity of the death penalty as a symbol: "One question that has proved more
difficult to answer than all others is what the present high levels of support for the
death penalty really support. Is it only the legal threat of the death penalty, coupled
with the judicial ritual of trying, convicting, and occasionally sentencing a murderer
to death rather than actual executions?").
39 See Hugo A. Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U.
Rxv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255, 262-66 (1991) (showing that prior to Furman, the ratio of
commutations to death sentences was approximately 3 to 8); see also W. BoWERS, ExECUTIONS IN AMmiucA 76 (1974) (stating that from two to four out of 10 death row

inmates escape execution through commutation); Scott, The PardoningPower, 284 ANNALs 95, 99 (1952) (hypothesizing that most of the 184 people who were sentenced to
death but not executed between the years 1940-46 undoubtedly received commutations). This is not to diminish, however, the central role of gubernatorial discretion
in controlling the number and pace of state executions through the signing of death
warrants.
40 Since January 1, 1973, only 72 death sentences have been commuted by gover-

nors. Death Row, U.S.A., supra note 25, at 1. For a history of executive clemency, see
generally Note, Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases,
39 N.Y.L. Rxv. 136 (1964). Professors Radelet and Zsembik demonstrate that the
post-Furman commutation figures overstate the role that executive clemency has
played. See generally Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in
Post-FurmanCapital Cases, 27 U. RicH. L. REv. 289 (1993). Fewer than one half of the
commutations are "humanitarian" in that they involve an assessment of the appropri-
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The federal courts are also out of the picture because of Pulley
v. Harris,4 McCleskey v. Kemp4 2 and the failure of Congress to enact
the Racial Justice Act. This leaves us with the state courts. To a
significant degree, they face the same risk of arousing the community as do other highly visible state officials. This is especially the
case if court decisions vacating death sentences are based on the
appellate court's judgments of death worthiness rather than on the
procedural grounds that are the traditional grist of appellate review in criminal cases. Even when judges limit themselves to these
usual modes of review, they are often unfairly attacked for their
death penalty rulings. Some are even defeated at the polls for their
effort to uphold the Constitution.43
Similar concerns would likely attach to decisions based on judicial findings of racial discrimination. As suggested earlier, I believe that political considerations of this sort are a major
explanation for the ineffectiveness of proportionality review over
the last twenty years. Moreover, my reading of hundreds of state
court proportionality review decisions during this period also indicates that most appellate judges are uncomfortable with proportionality review because of the substantive life or death issues it
implicates. Such decisions are painful, and in the view of many
jurists, inappropriate for them to make. A second concern relates
to the nontraditional methodology involving questions of data collection and analysis. A third concern is with the cost and complexity of an empirically based system of review. Finally, there is a
question of whether a principled system of proportionality review is
even possible. Years ago, Justice Rehnquist characterized the entire enterprise as "impossible" of attainment in any principled

ateness of a death sentence in terms of the "characteristics of the crime or the defendant." Id. at 305. The majority of the commutations are in response to judicial rulings
identifying constitutional violations or other legal errors in the defendant's penalty
trial. Radelet and Zsembik conclude that executive clemency post-Furman has failed
to "ensure that only the most blameworthy and irredeemable defendants are executed." Id. at 30.
41 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (stating that proportionality review is not required by the
Constitution).
42 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (allowing race discrimination claims under the Fourteenth
and Eighth Amendments, but under extremely onerous burdens of proof).
43 The politically dangerous environment in which many judges operate is described in graphic detail in Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the
Politics ofDeath: DecidingBetween the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in CapitalCases, 75
B.U.L. REv. 769, 776-91 (1995). See also Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational
Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived PoliticalPressures, 21 FORDHAM URBAN LJ.
239 (providing a transcript of an A.B.A. program).
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fashion."

As a result of these obstacles, we are most likely to see a meaningful commitment to proportionality review in Northern states
where the symbol of equal justice is most salient. In fact, there is
evidence of renewed interest in proportionality review in some
Northern courts, a trend which may reflect an awareness that actual executions are more imminent than in the past and that state
courts are now the only forum in which these issues can be heard.
For example, the Pennsylvania court, which has for years conducted perfunctory proportionality reviews, recently suggested that
it might be willing to explore problems with the database of cases it
maintains to inform its reviews. 45 Additionally, the Connecticut
court, which has traditionally taken a passive role on the issue of
proportionality review, has recently expressed a willingness to hear
statistically based claims of racial discrimination in the use of the
death penalty.46
In New York state, the new death penalty statute provides for
extensive proportionality review, including an explicit requirement
that the court of appeals consider claims of racial discrimination.47
In addition, the New York legislation directs the court of appeals to
develop a comprehensive database of information for all cases involving indictment for first-degree murder.4
Finally, in the Washington Supreme Court, proportionality review is a continuing issue, whose salience was recently enhanced by
a federal district court holding that the Washington court's system
of proportionality review was unconstitutional on due process
44 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 17. In spite of these misgivings and the lack of progress in most state courts, the occasional dissenting opinion by judges who take the
issue of proportionality review seriously indicate that a coherent and manageable, yet
comprehensive system of review is possible. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 449 S.E.2d 371,
381-86 (N.C. 1994) (Exxum, J., dissenting); State v. Jeffries, 717 P.2d 722, 742-46
(Wash. 1986) (Utter, J., dissenting); State v. Missouri, 648 S.W.2d 96, 111-13 (Mo.
1983) (Seiler, J., dissenting); State v. Rhines, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60 (S.D. 1960)
(Sabers, J. and Amundson, J., dissenting).
45 See Banks v. Commonwealth, 656 A.2d 467, 474 (Pa. 1995).
46 See State v. Cobb, 663 A.2d 948, 961 (Conn. 1995).
47 N.Y. CRim. PRoc. § 470.30(3) (a) (McKinney 1995) (requiring the court to consider "whether the imposition of the verdict or sentence [of death] was based upon
the race of the defendant or a victim of the crime for which the defendant was
convicted").
48 N.Y. JUD. LAw § 211-a (McKinney 1995). The New York Court of Appeals recently adopted a 19-page "Capital Case Data Report" that is to be completed by the
clerk of the trial court for each first-degree murder case processed through the system. N.Y.R. UNiF. TRiAL CTS. PART 218 (Uniform Rules for the Trial Courts in Capital
Cases). The actual data collection instrument is not included in the rules but is available from the court.
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grounds. 49
Consider again the broader question of limiting executions to
the worst cases. I see this largely as a political issue driven primarily
by the decisions of prosecutors and juries reflecting a determination that a reduced system is capable of satisfying the needs and
expectations of the community. It would be an incremental process analogous to the development of the common law - reflecting an evolving consensus that a sharply focused death penalty is in
the best interests of the community. It would distinctly not be a
top-down process driven by frequent appellate court decisions invalidating death sentences as excessive. In our culture, that outcome is no more likely than a program of mass executions. Rather,
we are more likely to see an interactive process between the court,
the prosecutorial community, the defense community, and the
public. Also, as noted earlier, in most states the exercise of gubernatorial discretion in signing death warrants is a major determinant of the number and pace of executions.
This prognosis is not to diminish the role of the state courts.
Indeed, I think their involvement is crucial on three levels. First is
the development of a comprehensive database to inform the community interested in the actual operation of its death penalty system process. Data can enlighten the decisions of the invisible
hand. Second, courts can provide crucial leadership and dialogue
with the prosecutorial and defense communities and the public.
Third, courts can ratify into law the emerging trends of
prosecutorial and jury decision. Let me briefly elaborate on these
points with some New Jersey illustrations.
The most important role for state courts is to develop a
database that provides an overview of the system and reliable information on the universe of cases that are used as comparison cases
in individual reviews. This task should be assumed by the court
and not left to the meager resources of capital defendants and
their attorneys. In addition to a database, the court can inform the
community dialogue by compiling simple tabulations of the flow of
cases through the system. For example, Tables 3 and 4, which are
routinely prepared and updated by the Administrative Office of
the New Jersey courts, present a comprehensive overview of the
New Jersey system.5 0
49 See Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Wash. 1994), afl'd on other
grounds sub nom. Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995) (offering no ruling on
the constitutionality of Washington's system of proportionality review).
50 The Office of the Attorney General of NewJersey, through its Division of Crimi-
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TABLE 3

Distribution of New Jersey Death-Sentencing Rates Among All
Death-Eligible Cases by Year of Penalty Trial or Conviction
(in Non-Penalty-Trial Cases): October 1995*
Year
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Average

Death-Sentencing Rate
.22
.25
.15
.20

(2/9)
(7/28)
(5/34)
(7/35)

.25 (8/32)
.04
.03
.10
.0
.0
.14
.13
.22
.13

(1/24)
(1/31)
(3/30)
(0/35)
(0/21)
(4/29)
(3/24)
(2/9)
(43/341)

* This table includes only defendants who are death-eligible under current law. It also

counts as a separate case each verdict sheet that was returned for multiple victims in
penalty trial cases.
This table includes all penalty trial cases sentenced through October 31, 1995.
Source: Administrative Office of the New Jersey Courts, Proportionality Review Report for State v.
Harris, Table 1,January 11, 1996.

nal Justice, Research and Evaluation Section, also compiles data of the type shown in
Tables 1 and 2. For a detailed description of the New Jersey system of comparative
proportionality review, see State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 613 A.2d 1059 (1992).
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TABLE 4

Distribution of New Jersey Penalty Trial Cases and
Death Sentencing Rates: 1983-1995*
A

Year

Death-Sentencing RatesAll Penalty-Trials

B
Death-Sentencing Rates
Among Cases That Are

Death-Eligible Under
Current Law

1983

.50 (3/6)

.40 (2/5)

1984

.33 (8/24)

.35 (7/20)

1985

.29 (7/24)

.26 (5/19)

1986

.35 (7/20)

.39 (7/18)

1987

.43 (9/21)

.42 (8/19)

1988

.09 (1/11)

.09 (1/11)

1989

.07 (1/15)

.08 (1/12)

1990

.43 (3/7)

1992

.38 (3/8)
.0 (0/6)
.0 (0/5)

.0
.0

1993

.40 (4/10)

.44 (4/9)

1994

.27 (3/11)

.30 (3/10)

1995

.29 (2/7)

.29 (2/7)

.29 (48/168)

.30 (43/145)

1991

Average

(0/4)
(0/4)

* This table includes all penalty trials which were sentenced on or before October 31, 1995.

It also counts as a separate case, each verdict sheet that was returned for multiple victims
in penalty trial cases.
Column A includes all penalty trials while Column B is limited to cases that are death
eligible under current law.
Source: Administrative Office of the New Jersey Courts, Proportionality Review Report for State v.
Harris, Table 2,January 11, 1996.

A database can also provide case typologies and simple tabulations,
which document death sentencing frequencies in different categories of similar cases. Tables 5 and 6 are two examples from New
Jersey. 1
51 Table 5 is an excerpt from the NewJersey "salient factors" measure of defendant
culpability. It classifies cases in terms of major statutory aggravating circumstances,

with subcategories determined by the presence of mitigating circumstances and nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. Table 6 measures defendant culpability in terms
of the number of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors present in the case.
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6

Death-Sentencing Rates Controlling for the Number of Aggravating and
Mitigating Factors Found by the Penalty Trial Jury or Present in
Non-Penalty-Trial Cases*
Number of
Statutory

Number of
Statutory
Mitigating
Circumstances

Aggravating
Circumstances

4
.00 (0/1)
.00 (0/1)

All Cases

.13 (43/341)

.00 (0/2)

1.0
.00
.50
.43
.00

3
(1/1)
(0/4)
(4/8)
(3/7)
(0/3)

.35 (8/23)

1.0
.38
.26
.14
.14
.00

2
(2/2)
(6/16)
(13/50)
(4/29)
(2/14)
(0/4)

.23 (27/115)

1
.10 (3/30)
.05 (4/74)

.00
.03
.00
.00

(0/55)
(1/35)
(0/5)
(0/2)

.04 (8/201)

* This table includes all cases in the universe that are death-eligible under current law (Novem-

ber 1995). It also includes multiple death-sentencing decisions in the cases in which a separate penalty-trial verdict was returned for two or more victims. For this anaysis, the 5h catchall
factor, which is found in 86% of all penalty-trial cases, was coded as being present in all nonpenalty-trial cases.
Source: Administrative Office of the New Jersey Courts, Proportionality Review Report for Stats v.
Harris,Table 9,January 11, 1996.

The New Jersey court has also provided leadership through
suggestions to the prosecutorial community,5" which in turn has
responded with the promulgation of standards for evaluating the
death worthiness of individual cases and the establishment of
53
county level capital case screening panels.
A word about complex statistical analyses. They may be helpful in some cases, but they are clearly not essential. Indeed, for the
purpose of helping the community dialogue focus on the worst
cases, quite rudimentary pictures of the system are sufficient. Tables 5 and 6 are good examples of simple statistical presentations.
Also, principled, well-focused reviews can be conducted strictly
with narrative factual summaries of the death sentenced review
54
case and the comparison cases.
52 See State v. Koedatich, 112 NJ. 225, 257, 548 A.2d 939, 955 (1988) (recommending that the attorney general and the county prosecutors adopt guidelines for
the selection of capital cases in order "to promote uniformity in the administration of
justice").
53 See Leigh Beinen et al., CapitalPunishment in New Jersey, 54 ALB. L. REv. 709, 79193 (1990).
54 For good examples of the effective use of narrative summaries in proportional-
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The state court function of ratification and rulemaking has
not progressed far in New Jersey, principally because the system is
still small and the number of cases in given categories is sparse.
However, in Florida and other states where the volume of cases is
substantial, some patterns are emerging. We see in the cases suggestions that some case categories are among the least culpable
and should be put beyond the risk of a death sentence either by a
court rule or a rebuttable presumption. Examples include cases
involving mentally ill defendants,55 killings arising out of violent
marital discord, 56 and cases of involving robbery murders with substantial mitigation.57
Finally, what might inform the process of identifying the worst
cases? The categories must appear reasonable and credible to the
supporters of the death penalty who believe it serves deterrent and
retributive functions. Considerations of deterrence and retribution place high on the list of such cases those involving multiple
killings, defendants with prior murder convictions, contract killings, police victim cases, extreme torture, and sexual assaults with
particular violence and terror. Also, empirical data from Georgia
and NewJersey suggest that the highest death sentencing rates are
in these case categories that appear most aggravated on a priori
ity review, see State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 645 A.2d 685 (1994); State v. Martini, 139 N.J.
3, 651 A.2d 949 (1994); State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 613 A.2d 1059 (1992); State v.
Williams, 452 S.E.2d 245 (N.C. 1994) (citing cases).
Recently, October 22, 1996, the New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a Special
Master to conduct, among other things, qualitative analyses of narrative summaries of
penalty trial cases as a vehicle for assessing the validity of claims of racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty by NewJersey penalty trialjuries. Order,
State v. Loftin, Supreme Court of NewJersey, A-86 - September Term (1996). This is
a salutary move by the New Jersey court since it will enable it to put aside technical
objections concerning the validity of the multiple regression analyses that produced
the original rankings of cases according to their levels of criminal culpability. The
court's Special Master will be in a position to produce groups of case that are "similar"
in terms of their criminal culpability, strictly on the basis of legal concepts of "culpability" that have been subjected to adversarial scrutiny in hearing before the Master
and are wholly independent of the assumptions of the statistical procedures that produced the original case rankings.
55 E.g. State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19, 29 (S.C. 1992) (Finney, J., dissenting) (finding defendant guilty but mentally ill).
56 See, e.g., Blakely v. State, 561 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. 1990) (stating that "murder is
a result of a heated domestic confrontation"); People v. Tye, 565 N.E.2d 931, 945 (fI1.
1991) (collecting cases) (vacating death sentence where there was no significant history of prior criminal conduct and the offense was precipitated by some stressful circumstances or other mental or emotional disturbance).
57 Sinclair v. State, 657 So.2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. 1995) (vacating death sentence
where robbery was the sole statutory aggravating circumstance with substantial mitigation present).
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grounds. The rates found in the other less aggravated categories
involving armed robbery, burglary, arson, kidnapping and grave
risk of death to others are substantially lower.58
D.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I believe that the process of proportionality review can usefully support movement toward a more narrowly focused death penalty system. Recall that when the overly broad
death statutes now in place in America were proposed by the American Law Institute in the Model Penal Code in the early 1960s and
adopted by state legislatures since 1972, no one knew what would
actually evolve from the administration of these statutes. Our current understanding from the experience of the last twenty years,
which can be greatly enhanced by the systemic collection of data by
state courts, could inform legislative, prosecutorial, and community judgments about the allocation of judicial resources in each
state's death penalty system. It could also support movements, particularly led by the state courts, toward limiting death sentencing to
the worst cases. This, in turn, could increase the efficiency of the
entire process and satisfy the death penalty's core symbolic func-

tions. Also, by reducing the risk of arbitrariness and discrimination
in the administration of the death penalty, the two symbols-the
death penalty and equal justice under the law-would no longer
clash but instead would peacefully coexist.

58 For example, in New Jersey, the penalty trial death sentencing rate among the
most aggravated cases is about 45%, and among all death eligible cases the rate is
about 35%. Among the less aggravated cases, the penalty phase death sentencing rate
is about 15% and the rate among all death eligible cases is about 6%. David C.
Baldus, Death Penalty Proportionality Review Project: Final Report to the NewJersey
Supreme Court (1991) (see Table 7). In Georgia, death sentencing rates from the
1970s are uniformly higher than the NewJersey rates. Among the aggravated categories, the penalty trial rates range between 60 and 70%, and among all death eligible

cases the rates are 10 to 15 percentage points lower. Among the less aggravated cases,
the rates are in the 30 to 50% range in the penalty phase, and in the 20 to 30% range
among all death eligible cases. Id. at 104, 110.

